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Abstract 
 
Interest in thermodynamic analogies in economics is older than the 
idea of von Neumann to look for market entropy in liquidity, 
advice that was not taken in any thermodynamic analogy 
presented so far in the literature. In this paper we go further and 
use a standard strategy from trading theory to pinpoint why 
thermodynamic analogies necessarily fail to describe financial 
markets, in spite of the presence of liquidity as the underlying 
basis for market entropy. Market liquidity of frequently traded 
assets does play the role of the ‘heat bath‘, as anticipated by von 
Neumann, but we are able to identify the no-arbitrage condition 
geometrically as an assumption of translational and rotational 
invariance rather than (as finance theorists would claim) an 
equilibrium condition. We then use the empirical market 
distribution to introduce an asset’s entropy and discuss the 
underlying reason why real financial markets cannot behave 
thermodynamically: financial markets are unstable, they do not 
approach statistical equilibrium, nor are there any available 
topological invariants on which to base a purely formal statistical 
mechanics. After discussing financial markets, we finally 
generalize our result by proposing that the idea of Adam Smith’s 
Invisible Hand is a falsifiable proposition: we suggest how to test 
nonfinancial markets empirically for the stabilizing action of The 
Invisible Hand.  
1. Entropy, Disorder, and Formal Thermodynamic Analogies 
 
Attempts at neo-classical equilibrium economic analogies with 
thermodynamics go back to Guilluame [1] and Samuelson [2]. Von 
Neumann apparently believed that thermodynamic formalism 
could potentially be useful in computer theory, for formulating a 
description of intelligience, and was interested in the possibility of 
a thermodynamics of economics. But presented with Guillaume’s 
work, he criticized it on the basis of the misidentification of a 
quantity as entropy [3].   
 
Much more recently, Smith and Foley [4] have presented a much 
more careful mapping of neo-classical equilibrium theory onto an 
apparently formal thermodynamics. The neo-classical equilibrium 
analog of the zeroth law requires identifying price as an intensive 
variable (not necessarily as temperature), and quantities of assets 
held are treated as extensive variables. Starting with utility 
maximization as the fundamental principle, analogs of 
thermodynamic potentials were defined purely formally by 
constructing Legendre transforms. A quantity that they identified 
as ‘entropy‘ was constructed as a Legendre transform on utility, 
with utility maximization being interpreted as analogous to 
entropy maximization for a closed mechanical system in 
thermodynamic equilibrium (entropy maximization is not the 
second law, but is a deduction from the second law).  
 
There are problems with the identification of entropy as utility, 
and we will discuss that in some detail. The real difficulty is that 
utility maximization in particular, and neo-classical equilibrium 
theory in general do not describe any real market, even as a zeroth 
order approximation. In real markets the physically observable 
variables, price p and quantity z of an asset held, treated by Smith 
and Foley fluctuate randomly, and utility does not appear at all, 
whereas the entropy of an asset presents itself to us directly: the 
entropy can be constructed from an observable quantity, namely, 
the histograms that define the market distribution.  
 
We therefore follow a different but related path in this paper: we 
ignore the neo-classical model and utility altogether, and start 
instead with the same observable intensive and extensive quantities 
that appear in Smith and Foley, the prices and quantities of assets 
held. These quantities then appear in a Legendre transform in a 
finance theory model that does describe real markets to a good 
first approximation. We use that Legendre transform and the 
underlying market fluctuations (the heat bath) as a basis for 
analyzing the very interesting question whether a formal 
thermodynamics of a financial market can be constructed. Finance 
is admittedly a special case of economics per se: it is the part of 
economics where data are both reliable and abundant, where 
trades can be studied on any time scale from a second to months 
or years. Good statistics are available for such studies up to about 
ten years. We will return to economics in general, where good 
statistics on many different time scales are generally not available, 
in parts 4 and 6. Our viewpoint is that financial markets are not 
tangential to economic theory, financial markets are presently the 
very best place to test both old and new ideas about economic 
theory. 
 
We will explain in part 4 why the Smith-Foley quantity identified 
as entropy cannot be identified as entropy in the sense of either 
statistical physics or information theory: in neo-classical 
equilibrium theory there is no analog of the heat bath, with 
disorder/uncertainty in the form of random fluctuations, only 
perfect order and complete information about all future markets 
and orders placed in those markets. Simply stated, their utility-
based ‘entropy‘ cannot represent disorder because disorder is not 
allowed in neo-classical equilibrium theory, nor are money and 
financial markets allowed in neo-classical theory for the same 
reason. We see this as the fatal flaw in an otherwise seemingly 
perfect mathematical mapping. We assert that one cannot find 
entropy in utility, one must look for entropy in disorder, as did 
Boltzmann, Gibbs, and Shannon. That is the basis for von 
Neumann’s earlier observation about the need to search for 
entropy in liquidity. Samuelson’s attempted thermal analogies can 
be criticized on the very same ground. 
 
We will therefore begin by identifying a financial analog of the 
heat bath, and will write down the stochastic equations describing 
the empirically-observed Brownian motion in that bath. We will 
then define physically what we mean by reversible trading, in 
close analogy with the idea of approximately reversible processes 
in laboratory thermodynamics. We will next make use of a trading 
strategy that is defined by a Legendre transform in order to ask if 
that transform and the underlying liquidity bath lead to an 
analogy with thermal equilibrium. Our Legendre transform is 
perfectly analogous to the ones treated formally by Smith and 
Foley, but the observable variables (price, quantity) fluctuate 
randomly because we deal with a real market, a market with 
entropy representing fundamental disorder.  
 
Our attempt to build a complete thermal analogy fails, but the way 
that it fails is both interesting and instructive. By carefully defining 
what our physical (meaning measureable/observable) quantities 
mean, we are led for the first time to a geometric definition of the 
no-arbitrage condition. We show explicitly why ‘no-arbitrage‘ is 
not, as both finance theorists and economists claim, an 
‘equilibrium‘ condition. Second, the market entropy (defined in 
part 5), reflecting the liquidity bath, does not and can not appear 
via a Legendre transform on the extensive quantities that we use in 
parts 3 and 4, showing that trying to define formal 
thermodynamics via Legendre transforms is not enough: you can’t 
reach the market entropy via transformations of variables unless 
you start with a quantity that is derived from entropy/disorder in 
the first place. Actually, we already know this lesson from classical 
thermodynamics since the time of Clausius: it is necessary to 
include ’heat‘ along with work in the energy in order to arrive at 
entropy (there is no physical analog of heat, representing 
underlying disorder, in the quantities used by Smith and Foley). 
We then go further in part 5 and identify market instability as the 
fundamental underlying reason why thermodynamic analogies are 
impossible in finance. Finally, in part 6 we offer an extention of our 
reasoning to economics as a whole in the form of a challenge.  
 
A word before going further. Equilibrium is not always essential 
for the identification of an abstract, formal thermodynamics, and 
neither is a heat bath, but a correct identification of entropy as 
disorder is necessary. E.g., entropy and formal thermodynamics 
exist [5] and have been constructed mathematically for the 
symbollic dynamics representing chaotic dynamical systems with 
generating partitions [6], but in this case the entropy is simply the 
Boltzmann entropy of the symbol sequences corresponding to a 
single Liapunov exponent, and therefore correctly describes 
disorder in the usual Boltzmann-Gibbs sense [7]. The underlying 
chaotic dynamical system is driven-dissipative and is far from 
equilibrium (one can illustrate the formal thermodynamics via a 
tent, logistic or Henon map, e.g.), but the entropy and 
thermodynamics are based on time-independent quantities and 
therefore do not contradict the nonequilibrium nature of the 
underlying dynamics that gives rise to the invariant symbollic 
dynamics. Another way to say it is that the formal 
thermodynamics and entropy are based on the topological 
invariants and generating partition of the dynamical system [6,7], 
and not at all on the time-evolution from initial conditions. In what 
follows, as in [4], we address the question of trying to use an 
economic (finance) model ‘directly‘ to construct a 
thermodynamics, because topological invariants (and generating 
partitions) do not exist in financial data in particular, or in 
economic phenomena more generally. That is, we simply apply 
empirically-based market dynamics to the same variables treated 
statically by Smith and Foley, but without the unnecessary 
introduction of empirically unobservable quantites like utility. 
 
  
2. Liquidity and Approximately Reversible Trading 
 
We define an approximately reversible trade as one where you can 
reverse your buy or sell order over a very short time interval, on 
the order of a few seconds or ticks, with only very small 
percentage losses. This is in analogy with approximately reversible 
processes in laboratory experiments in thermodynamics. This 
assumption requires a financial analog for the heat bath in 
thermodynamics. 
 
The assumption of adequate liquidity (we assume liquidity to 
include the requirement of ‘depth of market‘ here) is analogous to 
the assumption of a heat bath in thermodynamics: reversibly 
removing a small number of shares from the market does not 
affect the market price of the asset traded, just as reversibly 
removing a small amount of energy from the heat bath doesn’t 
affect to temperature, to zeroth order. We state here the 
assumptions central for attempting the financial analogy with 
thermodynamics. One is that transaction costs are negligible. 
Another is that the ‘liquidity bath’ is large enough that borrowing 
the money, selling the call and buying the stock are possible 
approximately instantaneously (during a few ticks in the market) 
without affecting the price of either the stock or call, or the interest 
rate r. That is, the desired margin purchase is assumed to be 
possible approximately reversibly in real time through your 
discount broker on your Mac or PC. This will not be possible if the 
number of shares involved is too large, or if the market crashes or 
balks (because bid/ask limit orders have too large a spread) at 
selling φ shares approximately reversibly. The ‘liquidity bath’ dries 
up in either case. The assumption of ‘no market impact‘ (meaning 
enough liquidity) during trading is an approximation that is 
limited to very small trades in a heavily-traded market and is 
easily violated when, e.g., Deutsche Bank takes a very large 
position in Mexican Pesos or Swedish Crowns (see Dacorogna et al 
[8] for a discussion of the effects of large limit orders on asset 
prices). 
 
In the theory of risk free hedges [9,10] in continuous time finance, 
approximately reversible trading is always implicitly assumed but 
is seldom stated explicitly. There, one can start with the 
replicating, self-financing hedging strategy and derive both the 
delta-hedge and the option pricing pde [10] simultaneously. The 
equations of the replicating, self-financing hedge have the 
structure of a Legendre transform. That, plus the ideas of 
reversibility and heat bath described above, permit us to ask if an 
underlying thermal analogy is possible. Next, we define the 
Legendre transform and also the equation of Brownian motion. 
Both require the assumption of a ‘big enough‘ liquidity bath. 
 
3. The Replicating Self-Financing Hedge  
 
Consider a dynamic hedging strategy (φ,ψ) defined as follows [10]. 
Suppose you’re short a European call at price C(p,K,t,T) where K 
and T are the strike price and time. To cover your bet that the 
underlying stock price will drop, you simultaneously buy φ shares 
of the stock at price p by borrowing ψ dollars from the broker (the 
stock is bought on margin, e.g.). In general, the strategy consists of 
holding φ(p,t) shares of stock at price p, a risky asset, and ψ(p,t) 
shares of a money market fund at initial price m=1 Euro/share, a 
riskless asset (with fixed interest rate r) at all times t≤T during the 
bet, where T is the strike time.  At the initial time to the call is 
worth 
 
  
(1) 
 
  C(po , t o ) = !op o + " omo
where mo=1 Euro. This is the initial condition, and the idea is to 
replicate this balance at all later times t≤T without injecting any 
new money into the portfolio. Assuming that (φ,ψ) are twice 
differentiable functions (as would be needed for a 
thermodynamics analogy), the portfolio is self-financing if, during 
dt, 
 
 (2) 
 
so that 
 
(3) 
 
where dm=rmdt. In (3), dp is a stochastic variable, and p(t+dt) and 
C(t+dt) are unknown and random at time t when p(t) and C(p,t) 
are observed. Viewing C as a function of (p,m), eqn. (3) tells us that 
 
(4) 
 
This is the delta-hedge condition. Next, we want the portfolio in 
addition to be ‘replicating’, meaning that the functional 
relationship 
 
 (5) 
 
holds for all later (p,t) up to expiration, and p is the known price at 
time t (for a stock purchase, we can take p to be the ask price). 
Equation (5) expresses the idea that holding the stock plus money 
market in the combination (φ,ψ) is equivalent to holding the call. 
The strategy (φ,ψ), if it can be constructed, defines a ‘synthetic call’: 
the call at price C is synthesized by holding a certain number φ>0 
shares of stock and ψ<0 of money market at each instant t and 
price p(t). These conditions, combined with Ito’s lemma, predict 
the option pricing equation and therefore the price C of the call 
  dC = !dp + "dm
  
! =
"C
"p
  C(p, t) = !(p, t)p + "(p, t)m
  d!p + d"m = 0
[10,11]. Equations (2-5) are standard finance theory and form the 
basis for attempting the thermal analogy in part 4. 
 
The stochastic differential equation (sde) for the stock price is 
given by 
 
 (6) 
 
and represents Brownian motion in the liquidity bath. Here, B(t) 
defines a Wiener process, with <dB>=0 and <dB2>=dt, [10,11] one 
easily obtains the sde 
 
 (7) 
 
From these equations then follows the option-pricing partial 
differential equation (pde) with diffusion coefficient σ2(p,t)p2. the 
restriction to lognormal distributions or standard Black-Scholes (B-
S) theory is neither implied nor necessary [11]. In B-S theory one 
has σ=constant, but the empirical distribution of returns suggests 
an entirely different and unrelated functional form for σ2(p,t) 
[12,13]. We are therefore not assuming ordinary Brownian motion 
of the simple Einstein variety in the logarithmic return 
x=ln(p(t)/po), although our reasoning applies to that model as 
well. 
  dC = (
˙ C + ! 2p2 " " C /2)dt + " C dp
  dp = Rpdt +!(p, t)pdB
 
4. The geometric meaning of ‘no-arbitrage‘  
 
Equations (3), (4) and (5) with stochastic variables (C,p) define a 
Legendre transform. This is the formal motivation for discussing a 
thermal anlogy. The variables p and m are intensive, (φ,ψ) are 
extensive variables, and so the call price C is an extensive variable, 
analogous to a thermodynamic potential. The attempt to identify p 
and m as analogous to a specific pair of intensive thermodynamic 
variables, like pressure and temperature, is both uninteresting and 
unnecessary, because all extensive variables obey a zeroth law in 
thermal equilibrium.  
 
The interesting parts of the attempted analogy are, first, that the 
assumption of adequate liquidity is analogous to the heat bath: 
reversibly removing a small number of shares from the market 
does not affect the market price, just as reversibly removing a 
small amount of energy from the heat bath doesn’t affect to 
temperature, to zeroth order. Second, following the zeroth law of 
thermodynamics, the absence of arbitrage possibilities would then 
have to be analogous to thermal equilibrium, where there are no 
correlations: one can’t get something for nothing out of the heat 
bath because of the second law. Likewise, arbitrage is impossible 
systematically in the absence of correlations (this is essentially the 
content of the efficient market hypothesis, that there exist no 
correlations that can be exploited for profit).  
 
In finance theory [14]  the no arbitrage condition is called an 
‘equilibrium‘ condition. We will now try to make that analogy 
precise. First, some oversimplified statistical thermodynamics. In a 
system in thermal equilibrium there is spatial homogeneity and 
isotropy, the temperature is the same throughout the system 
independent of position. The same time-dependent temperature 
fluctuations may be observed at any point in the system. Such 
fluctuations are described by an asymptotically stationary 
stochastic process like 
 
 
 (8) 
 
  d!T = "#!Tdt+$dB(t)
with the mean square fluctuation at long times given by 
 
(9) 
 
and an equilibrium density of fluctuations (for βΔt>>>1)  about 
ΔT=T-Teq given by the stationary distribution 
 
 
(10) 
 
Whether in economic theory ‘equilibrium‘ is taken to mean 
statistical equilibrium or, more generally, a steady state, is 
irrrelevant as we will point out in part 5 below. Both statistical 
equilibria (entropy maxima, for a closed system) and stable steady 
states require an asymptotically-stationary stochastic process. Now 
for the question whether the finance/thermo analog can be carried 
to completion. 
 
First, we can see easily that the no-arbitrage condition does not 
guarantee market equilibrium, which is defined by vanishing total 
excess demand for an asset. The excess demand ε(p,t) is defined by 
dp/dt=ε(p,t) and is given by the right hand of the sde (6) as drift 
plus noise. Consider two spatially-separated markets with two 
different price distributions for the same asset. If enough traders 
go long in one market and short in the other, then the market price 
distributions can be brought into agreement. However, if there is 
positive excess demand for the asset then the average price of the 
asset will continue increasing with time, so that there is no 
equilibrium.   
 
Next, in order to understand the main point, consider a spatial 
distribution of markets with different price distributions at each 
location, e.g., N.Y., Frankfurt, London, Tokyo, … . That is, the 
price distribution depends on both position and time. It is easy to 
formulate the no arbitrage condition in the language of statistical 
physics. In a physical system in thermal equilibrium the average 
temperature is constant throughout the system, is independent of 
location. The temperature fluctuations at each point in the system 
  !
2
= "T2 = kTeq
2 /cV
  
f(!T) =
1
2"#2
e
$!T2 /# 2
obey a stationary process. The no arbitrage condition requires 
spatial homogeneity and isotropy of the price distribution (to 
within transaction, shipping and customs fees, and taxes). An 
example of an arbitrage opportunity would represented by two 
different markets where in the distribution of the second market 
theprice variable is uniformly shifted by a constant δp relative to 
the first market. A ‘no arbitrage‘ condition is therefore equivalent 
to translational and rotational invariance of the price distribution. 
But the financial market price distribution is not stationary (we 
explain this assertion in the next section), so that equilibrium is not 
achieved even if arbitrage is impossible. A collection of markets 
with arbitrage possibilities can be formulated via a master 
equation where the distribution of prices is not spatially 
homogeneous, but varies (in average price, e.g.) from market to 
market.  
 
To make closer contact with the reasoning of Smith and Foley [4], 
where temperature and pressure analogs are identified from utility 
maximization via Legendre transforms and the zeroth law of 
thermodynamics is applied, we note the following. In physics, we 
define the empirical temperature t of an equilibrium system with 
energy E and volume V (one could equally-well use any other pair 
of extensive variables), where for any of n mentally-constructed 
subsystems of the equilibrium system we have 
 
 (11) 
  
This condition, appled to systems in thermal contact with each 
other, reflects the historic origin of the need for an extra,  non-
mechanical variable called temperature. As we have stated above, 
instead of temperature one can as well take any other intensive 
variable, e.g., pressure or chemical potential. The economic analog 
of equilibrium would then be the absence of arbitrage possibilities, 
that there is only one price of an asset in n different markets 
 
 (12) 
 
This is a standard neo-classical condition for a unique, time-
independent price p=f(z) where z is the quantity of an asset held at 
  
t = f(E
1
, V
1
) = ...f(En , Vn )
  
p = f(!
1
,"
1
) = ...f(!n ,"n )
price p that would follow from utility maximization. We would 
need to be able to derive a condition like (12) in order to come into 
partial agreement with the ideas of Smith and Foley. However, we 
cannot derive the condition (12) from our model (6), which is not 
neo-classical and yields a t-dependent average price. The reason 
that we cannot derive such a condition is that we cannot allpy the 
idea of statistical equilibrium to the market variables. 
 
 
Now for our central criticism of the paper by Smith and Foley [4]. 
They have proposed a thermodynamic interpretation of the 
standard neo-classical relationship p=f(z) that follows from utility 
maximization. In their discussion a quantity labeled as entropy is 
formally defined in terms of Legendre-transformed utility, but the 
quantity so-defined cannot represent disorder/uncertainty 
because there is no liquidity, no analog of the heat bath, in neo-
classical equilibrium theory. The ground for our assertion has been 
established within the context of neo-classical theory. Kirman [15] 
has pointed out, following Radner’s proof of noncomputability of 
neo-classical equilibria under slight uncertainty [16], that demand 
for money (liquidity demand) does not appear in neo-classical 
equilibrium theory, where the future is completely determined for 
all times [17]. Kirman speculates very that liquidity demand arises 
from uncertainty (disorder). This seems to be a reasonable 
speculation. The paper by Bak et al [18] is motivated by the fact 
that a standard neo-classical economy is a pure barter economy 
(the model used by Smith and Foley), where price p is merely a 
label because the absolute value of money is undetermined. In the 
model by Bak et al money appears, but markets are still cleared at 
the end of each day1. In real markets, market clearing occurs 
seldom and, when it does, it is generally accompanied by 
unsatisfied demand (one can think of the fish market in Chioggia, 
e.g.). 
 
The absence of entropy representing disorder in neo-classical 
equilibrium theory can be contrasted with thermodynamics of 
physical systems in the following way: for a market let us define 
the economic efficiency of an asset as 
                                                
1 In a standard neo-classical economy there is no capital accumulation, no financial market, and also no 
production of goods. Ref. [18]  is interesting, it introduces a model of bounded rationality via local 
interactions between agents. 
 
 (13) 
 
where S and D are net supply and net demand for that market. In 
standard neo-classical equilibrium the efficiency is 100%, e=12, 
whereas the second law of thermodynamics via the heat bath 
prevents 100% efficiency in thermodynamic machines. That is, the 
neo-classical market equilibrium condition e=1 is not a 
thermodynamic efficiency, unless we would be able to interpret it 
as the zero (Kelvin) temperature result of an unknown 
thermodynamic theory (100% efficiency of a machine is 
thermodynamically possible only at zero absolute temperature). 
One cannot derive a noncontradictory Carnot efficiency e<1 from 
the formalism of Smith and Foley without assuming zero absolute 
temperature because, in neo-clasical equilibrium theory, the 
market efficiency is stuck at 100%. 
 
5. Instability of Financial Markets 
 
How do real markets behave? Are stationary processes indicated 
by nonfinancial economic data? We as physicists know that 
financial markets are not near equilibrium, but finance theorists 
nevertheless sometimes try to analyze the data by using 
transformations to variables that assume an underlying stationary 
process. But is stationarity possible for financial markets, 
empirically-seen? 
 
We have discovered [12,13] that the empirical distribution for 
interday trading of bonds and foreign exchange, written in terms 
of returns x=ln(p(t)/p(to)), is exponential  
 
                                                
2 Efficiency e<1 occirs in asymmetric information theory (see Ackerlof [19] and Stiglitz [20]), but the 
method is still restricted to dynamic equilibria via expected utility maximization (there is no entropy, 
no statistical equilibrium in the model). 
  
e = min(
D
S
,
S
D
)
 
(14) 
 
excepting extreme returns. Here, ν=1/b√Δt and γ=1/b‘√Δt with b 
and b‘ constants and with R assumed constant for interday trading 
(this condition is not essential, R can be taken to be t-dependent). 
The time-dependence of γ and ν guarantees that the global (or 
average volatility) obeys σ2=<D(x,t)>Δt=cΔt with c constant, and 
where the average is over the density f(x,t). The diffusion 
coefficient (‘local volatility‘) generating this distribution via the 
Fokker-Planck equation  
 
 
(15) 
 
or corresponding sde 
 
 
 
(16) 
 
is found to be 
 
 
(17) 
 
 
for small to moderate returns. This model will now be used to 
discuss the stability of financial markets, and is easily generalized 
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  dx = Rdt + D(x, t)dB(t)
to describe the observed fat tails in the empirical returns density f 
by adding a term on the order of ((x-RΔt)/Δt1/2)2 to the diffusion 
coefficient (17) [13]. 
 
The entropy of the market distribution, which we introduce next, 
plays no role in the attempted thermodynamic analogy 
represented by (2) and (5). The Gibb’s entropy S(t) of the empirical 
returns distribution with density f(x,t) is simply  
 
  (18) 
 
and, so constructed, correctly represents the disorder of the market 
for the asset under consideration.  Statistical equilibrium is 
impossible because, according to (14), this entropy is always 
increasing. The entropy S(t) can never reach a maximum because 
the empirical density f(x,t) spreads diffusively without bound, 
describing the loss of information about market returns (or prices) 
as time goes on.  
 
More generally, either of two separate conditions is enough to 
prevent entropy maximization, or market equilibration: the time-
dependent diffusion coefficient D(x,t), and the lack of finite upper 
and  lower bounds on x. E.g., with a t-independent volatility D(x) 
and expected stock rate of return R(x), the solution of (15) 
describing statistical equilibrium 
 
 (19) 
  
obviously exists mathematically, but there is no guarantee that this 
solution can be reached dynamically by the time evolution of an 
arbitrary distribution. We will return to this point via an 
enlightening example below, where a particle in a harmonic 
potential is completely delocalized by a simple price-dependent 
diffusion coefficient. However, if we impose constraints whereby 
the particle with position x(t) = ln(p(t)/p(0)) is confined by two 
walls, pmin≤p≤pmax (e.g., by price controls), time evolution to 
statistical equilibrium could always be achieved. This is not what 
is taught in standard economics texts [17]. In Nakamura [21], the 
  
S(t) = ! f(x, t) ln f(x, t)dx
!"
"
#
  
f(x) =
C
D(x)
e
2
R (x)
D( x)
dx!
stabilizing Invisible Hand is misinterpreted as the no-arbitrage 
condition, but as we have shown in part 4 above, the absence of 
arbitrage opportunities has nothing to do with either market 
stability or equilibrium.  
 
Similar words can be asserted about the condition for a steady 
state, where one would (following Onsager and Machlup) 
introduce a quantity related to entropy that is maximized. To 
derive a steady state distribution, we rewrite (12) as 
 
 
(20) 
 
The condition for a steady state is that j=constant, leading to a 
solution that differs with (20) but, again, one where t-independent 
R and D are necessary. Here, the process described by (16) must be 
stationary, so that the mean and variances of x are necessarily 
constants. Stationary processes describe steady states and vice-
versa, with equilibrium given by the special case where j=0. 
 
To make the contrast between real markets and equilibrium 
statistical physics sharper, we remind the reader that a Brownian 
particle in equilibrium in a heat bath has a velocity distribution 
that is Maxwellian. The sde that describes the approach of a 
nonequilibrium distribution of particle velocities to statistical 
equilibrium is the Smoluchowski-Ornstein-Uhlenbeck sde [22] for 
the particle’s velocity 
 
 
(21) 
 
The distribution of positions X is also generated by a Fokker-
Planck equation, but subject to boundary conditions that confine 
the particle to a finite volume V so that the equilibrium 
  
!f(x, t)
!t
= "
!j(x, t)
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1
2
!(D(x, t)f(x, t))
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  dv = !"vdt+ #dB
distribution of positions is constant and describes time-
independent fluctuations about statistical equilibrium. The 
corresponding stochastic process is stationary, the same as 
equation (8) above. Nothing comparable is possible with the model 
sde (16) that generates the empirical financial market distribution.  
 
We can see this by comparing the stationary process (21) with the 
Osborne-Black-Scholes lognormal pricing model. In (21) statistical 
equilibrium is reached because the particle is confined by a 
harmonic potential in velocity space, U(v)=βv2/2. Every physicist 
knows that a harmonic potential means bounded motion. Stated in 
terms of the price variable, the Osborne lognormal pricing model 
[23,24] is defined by 
 
 
(22) 
 
With negative expected returns µ<0 the only difference with (21) is 
that the diffusion coefficient is proportional to ‘velocity‘ p, so on 
the basis of our experience in statistical physics we would expect 
that the harmonic price potential  
 
(23) 
 
leads to confined motion (localization in p-space) and a 
corresponding approach to statistical equilibrium. That is, we 
would expect that (22) defines a stationary process when µ<0. But 
the physics intuition is completely wrong here. There is indeed a 
statistical equilibrium distribution for (22), for all values of µ, but 
the lognormal distribution (the Green function for (22)) cannot 
approach it as time goes to infinity so long as p can become 
infinite. That is, the particle is not bound by the potential (23) but 
is delocalized! The delocalization is reflected by the fact that the 
lognormal distribution spreads without limit as t increases, never 
reaching statistical equilibrium. Otherwise said, the moments of 
the lognormal distribution are t-dependent and do not approach 
constants asymptotically. This nonintuitive example shows the 
danger of ’existence proofs‘ for equilibria that ignore dynamics 
  dp = µpdt+ !pdB
  
U(p) =
µ
2
p
2
(see Kaniovski [25] for an example of an existence proof that 
ignores dynamics).  
 
Financial markets cannot be described even to zeroth order by a 
stationary distribution, but all neo-classical thinking (standard 
textbook economic theory [17]) is based on the implicit assumption 
of stable equilibrium. Because financial data are nonstationary, 
neo-classical economists have introduced the misleading notion of 
‘temporary price equilibria‘ [26] in order to try to save the 
underlying wrong ideas in the face of the empirical data. We have 
shown elsewhere [11] that the notion of ‘temporary price 
equilibria‘ is self-contradictory: in that definition there is an 
artificially- and arbitrarily-defined ‘excess demand‘ that is made to 
vanish, whereas the actual excess demand ε(p) defined correctly  
by dp/dt=ε(p) by drift plus white noise in (6) above appears in 
that model but never vanishes. Qualitatively, temporary price 
equilibria amount to assuming that  each particle location in 
Brownian motion is an’equilirbium‘ that is interrupted by a 
‘shock‘, but in real markets the Brownian motion (the ‘shocks‘) 
occurs on the time scale of one second, so that the language makes 
no sense at all, physically. 
 
We have pointed out elsewhere [27] that there are at least 5 
separate ideas of ‘equilibrium‘ in economics and finance, 4 of 
which are completely wrong. Here, we add out a 6th wrong 
definition of ‘equilibrium‘: Fama [28] misidentified market 
averages as describing ‘market equilibrium‘, in spite of the fact 
that those averages are time-dependent. The only dynamically 
acceptable definition of equilibrium is that price p is constant, 
dp/dt=0, respecting the equilibrium requirement of vanishing 
excess demand. In stochastic theory this is generalized (as in 
statistical physics and thermodynamics) to mean that all average 
values are time-independent, so that <p>=constant and, 
furthermore, all moments of the price (or returns) distribution are 
time-independent. This would correspond to a state of statistical 
equilibrium defined by (19) or a steady state, where prices would 
fluctuate with constant variance about constant average values 
(with vanishing excess demand on the average), but this state has 
never been observed in data obtained from real markets, nor is it 
predicted by any model that describes real markets empirically-
correctly.  This takes us to the last point. 
 
 
6. The Invisible Hand is a Falsifiable Proposition 
 
Statistical equilbrium of financial markets is impossible, 
empirically-seen. Financial markets cannot be correctly described 
as stationary processes. Adam Smith’s Invisible Hand, which is 
assumed by economists to be of general validity, is an assumption 
that markets are in or near stable equilibrium, reaquiring the 
implicit assumption of a stationary process. Consider any market 
anywhere in the world. With unfilled limit orders the excess 
demand ε(p,t), defined by dp/dt= ε(p,t), cannot vanish. Market 
stability would be represented by the state of statistical 
equilibrium, or at least a stable steady state, where the price p(t) 
would satisfy the condition for a stationary stochastic process. 
Standard economic theory has it wrong: apparently, one cannot 
have both unregulated/deregulated markets and stability 
simultaneously. One might at best have either stable equilibrium 
or total lack of regulations/constraints, but not both. In between 
lies a whole spectrum of other possibilities based on the regulation 
of otherwise free markets, from less to more unstable4.   
 
We assumed in the paragraph above that examples of stable 
markets are not likely to be found. It is necessary to pose this 
assertion as a scientific challenge: Is it possible to find examples of 
stability in nonfinancial markets? One could search for market 
stability by using the following method: choose any nonfinancial 
market with data adequate for determining the time development 
of the empircal price distribution (we can study the time-
development of the finance distribution accurately because we 
have accurate data over the last twelve or so years). If the 
distribution is stationary or approaches stationarity 
asymptotically, then The Invisible Hand stabilizes the market. 
With a stationary process the variance approaches a constant as 
initial correlations die out, equilibrium markets are not volatile. 
For diffusive markets like financial ones, in contrast, the variance 
is always increasing with time Δt. The question of the existence of 
Adam Smith’s Invisible Hand can be removed from politics and 
ideology, it can be decided scientifically.  
 
                                                
4 For real examples of market instability vs. the neo-classical equilibrium prescriptions enforced by the 
World Bank and the IMF as conditions for loans, see Stiglitz [29], in particular pp. 101-3 and 128-30. 
We expect that empirical evidence for stationary markets cannot 
be found anywhere on the globe. This provides a direct challenge 
to economists, who advise and direct national treasury 
departments and international agencies like the World Bank and 
IMF on the basis of the neo-classical model of equilibria, and 
where stability is assumed without having been demonstrated. 
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